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IN THE UTAH SUPREME COURT

BRENT ' W

BROWN,

Plaintiff/Appellant,

]

vs.

1)

GERALDINE K. BROWN,

)

Defendant/Respondent.

Case No. 890293-CA

]

BRIEF IN OPPOSITION TO WRIT OF CERTIORARI

LIST OF PARTIES
The parties to this Writ of Certiorari are identified in the
caption of this case.
COURT OF APPEALS OPINION
The opinion of the Utah Court of Appeals was issued August
31, 1990 and remitted October 4, 1990.

Judge Russell W. Bench

authored the opinion and Judge Richard C. Davidson and Gregory K.
Orme concurred.

A copy of the opinion is included in the

addendum attached to this brief.
The only issue raised by Geraldine Brown in her Writ of
Certiorari

is the adequacy of the award of attorney fees at the

trial level and reversal of the award of attorney fees at the
appellate court level.

STATEMENT OF FACTS
1.

Brent Brown and Geraldine Brown were divorced by Decree

of Divorce on March 28, 1986. (Record 50-2.)
2.
parties.

The decree valued and divided property owned by the
Paragraph 11 of the trial court's findings made at the

time of the decree states:
That the parties have acquired the following
property during their marriage: Home in
North Logan, $275,000; six acres in North
Logan, $95,000, subject to an approximately
$10,000 liability for bringing utility and
irrigation systems to the property previously
sold to Dr. Hawkes; one-seventh interest in
four acres at 18th North in Logan; one-fourth
interest in 28 acres at Bear Lake, $15,000;
one-fourth interest in the Salt Lake metal
building; $25,000; two percent interest in 29
acres Temple View, Salt Lake City, $20,000;
hangar for aircraft, $10,000; 1985 Buick Park
Avenue, $10,000; 1983 Buick Century $4,500;
1981 Buick Riviera, $6,000; 1983 19 foot
power boat, $10,000; 1979 aircraft, $80,000;
1985 Ford 1210 tractor and accessories,
$9,300; 1982 1100 Suzuki motorcycle, $2,000;
profit sharing fund with ISE, $59,212.58;
one-half interest in BH Leasing, $20,000;
silver, $6,000; furnishings in the home in
North Logan, $25,000; personal property with
[Brent Brown], $3,500; furnishings in [Brent
Brown's] apartment, $2,390; severance pay
from Brae Corporation, $20,000; income tax
refund 1985 subject to any tax payable and
costs of preparation, approximately $2,200;
IRA accounts with $6,372 in [Brent Brown's]
name and $4,840 in [Geraldine Brown's] name;
Merrill Lynch accounts, $191,679.69; and
North Park Bank stock, no value. That
[Geraldine Brown] should be awarded the home,
valued at $275,000, the Buick Century, Buick
Riviera, and the Ford tractor and
accessories, valued at $19,800; and the
furnishings in the home valued at $25,000 and
-2-

the North Park Bank stock of no value/ and
[Geraldine Brown] should be awarded the
balance of the property except for the Brae
severance pay which should be split between
the parties, the net income tax refund, which
should be split between the parties, and each
party should be awarded their IRA accounts
with [Brent Brown] paying to [Geraldine
Brown] $766 for the difference. [Geraldine
Brown] should be awarded $108,016.13 of the
$191,679.69 of the Merrill Lynch account for
56.352 percent of the said fund.
3.

Subsequent to the divorce, one of the three children

reached the age of majority.

At the time of the modification

hearing, two children were minors: A son, 13, and a daughter, 7.
(Transcript, page 17, lines 21-25/ page 18, lines 1-6).
4.

Subsequent to the divorce, Geraldine Brown turned the

management of her investments to a financial planner, Aaron
Lichfield (Transcript, page 43, lines 14-25/ page 44, page 45,
lines 1-12/ page 58, lines 7-25/ pages 59-71), received
approximately $10,000.00 per year from the investments
(Transcript, page 82, lines 12-23), chose not to sell the home
(Transcript, page 72, lines 5-21/ page 84, lines 7-25/ page 85,
lines 1-16/ page 119, lines 16-25/ page 120-121/ page 122, lines
1-17), in the approximately three years since the divorce took
four college courses at Utah State University totaling 17 hours
of credit (Transcript, page 867, lines 20-25/ pages 87-87/ page
90, lines 9-14/ page 111, lines 13-25/ pages 112-115/ page 117,
lines 20-25/ page 118/ page 119, lines 1-15), did not decide what

-3-

field to pursue in school (Transcript, page 89, lines 1-7), did
not look for a job (Transcript, page 89, lines 8-25); page 90,
lines 1-10/ page 109, lines 19-25/ page 110/ page 111, lines 112/ page

116, lines 17-23), planned to take eight or more years

to graduate from college (Transcript, page 90, lines 11-14).
5.

Geraldine Brown stipulated at the time of her deposition

that except for a lack of skills, she had the ability to work.
In response to Brent Brown's counsel's question, she and her
counsel stated:
Q. And in addition, aside from the
limitations you've given, you're healthy
and have the ability to work?
A.

Define "ability."

Q. Well, you can go to work for
eight hours a day.
Mr. Jewell: We acknowledge that.
We'll stipulate that she has the ability.
Q.

All right.

(Deposition of Geraldine K. Brown, taken January 4, 1989, page
58, lines 17-23.)
6.

Geraldine Brown's living expenses decreased from the

time of the divorce decree to the time of the modification.
Neither the original decree findings nor the modification
findings refer specifically to the living expenses of Geraldine
Brown.

The only evidence produced on Geraldine Brown's expenses

was testimony given by Geraldine Brown in response to Brent
-4-

Brown's counsel at the modification trial.

In essence, Geraldine

Brown testified her expenses at the time of the modification
hearing were one-third less than at the time of the divorce
trial.

(Transcript, page 128, lines 7-25; page 129; page 130,

lines 1-20.)
COURSE OF PROCEEDINGS
1.

Geraldine Brown filed her Petition to Modify Decree of

Divorce on or about December 14, 1987.
2.

Trial on the petition to modify was held February 28,

1989, before the Honorable Judge VeNoy Christoffersen.
3.

Judge Christoffersen issued a Memorandum Decision on

March 3, 1989. A copy of the Memorandum Decision is included in
the Addendum attached to this brief.

The following was decided

by Judge Christoffersen on the attorney fee issue:
Defendant is also asking attorney's fees
for this. Section 30-3-3 of the U.C.A. has
been interpreted to include actions for
modification. See Kallas v. Kallas, 614 P.2d
641. Plaintiff's ability to pay attorney's
fees is obviously much greater than that of
the defendant, the defendant only having the
income that she realizes from investment of
funds she received from the divorce plus her
child support and alimony. Defendant's
counsel testified as to the hours and the
necessity of the amount of hours for purpose
of his hearing and the reasonableness of his
hourly fee and with the figure of around
$4,000.00 attorney's fees. However in
checking over his Exhibit showing the amount
of time spent, namely concerning the cost of
the curb or gutter. The Court feels there
are some items that were not necessary and
has therefore reduced the attorney's fees
-5-

award to $3,000.00 as opposed to $4,000 plus
costs.
4.

In the Findings of Fact signed and entered April 7,

1989, Judge Christoffersen made the following findings as to
attorney fees:
Defendant's counsel testified regarding
attorney's fees, showing the time spent, the
hourly rate charged, and the necessity of the
number of hours spent in light of the
difficulty of the case. It was stipulated by
counsel for the Plaintiff that the rate
charged was a reasonable one and was commonly
charged for such actions in the community.
The Court finds that Plaintiff's ability to
pay attorney's fees is obviously much greater
than that of Defendant. Defendant only
having the income that she realizes from
investment of funds she received from the
divorce plus her child support and alimony.
However, in checking over the exhibit
provided by Defendant's counsel showing the
amount of time spent, the court feels that
there are some items that were not necessary;
namely, concerning the costs of curb and
gutter, the Court, therefore, finds that a
reasonable award of attorney's fees to
Defendant from Plaintiff is $3,000.00, plus
costs.
In the Conclusions of Law, the following conclusion was
made :
In view of the difference in earning
ability and actual income received by both
parties, Defendant has sufficiently
demonstrated the financial need for
attorney's fees. The Court concludes that
$3,000.00 is a reasonable amount for
attorney's fees and that the number of hours
spent were necessary in light of the
difficulty of the case, the rate charged for
attorney's fees was reasonable as stipulated
b
Y opposing counsel and is commonly charged
-6-

for divorce actions in the community and that
the award of attorney's fees is based on the
need and results achieved in the case.
The Order and Judgment awarded Geraldine Brown a $3,000
judgment for attorney's fees against Brent Brown.

A copy of the

Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law and Judgment and Order
are included in the Addendum attached to this Brief.
5.

Brent Brown appealed the case on May 4, 1989.

Included

in the issues on appeal was the judgment for attorney fees.
6.

Geraldine did not file a cross appeal.

7.

In its opinion filed August 31, 1990, and remitted

October 4, 1990, the Court of Appeals wrote the following on the
attorney fee judgment:
ATTORNEY FEES
Appellee was awarded attorney fees by
the trial court based on the difference in
earning ability of the parties. Appellant
argues that this was an abuse of the trial
court's discretion in that appellee failed to
prove that she was in financial need.
Before a trial court may award attorney
fees in a divorce matter, the requesting
party must show that award of attorney fees
is "reasonably needed by the party requesting
the award." Huck v. Huck, 734 P.2d 417, 419
(Utah 1986). In essence, appellee must show
that she would be "unable to cover the costs
of litigation." Kerr v. Kerr, 610 P.2d 1380,
1384 (Utah 1980).
The trial court, however, erroneously
concluded that attorney fees were warranted
because "[p]laintiff's ability to pay
attorney fees is obviously much greater than
that of defendant."
-7-

In support of the trial court's
conclusion, appellee cites Andersen v.
Andersen, 757 P.2d 476, 480 (Utah Ct.App.
1988) for the proposition that disparity
between the parties' abilities to pay is a
sufficient ground upon which to find need.
We note, however, that in Andersen the
"plaintiff testified that she had no means
with which to pay her fees." Id. at 48 0
(emphasis added). Appellee, on the other
hand, has significant means with which to pay
her fees. Cf^ Huck, 734 P.2d at 420
(granting of attorney fees when party had no
"liquid assets").
In light of appellee's significant
assets, we find that she failed to meet her
burden of proof that she reasonably needed
the award. We therefore vacate the trial
court's award of attorney fees. No cost or
fees awarded on appeal.
ARGUMENT
POINT I
REVIEW BY WRIT OF CERTIORARI IS INAPPROPRIATE
IN THIS CASE.
Geraldine Brown seeks review of the Court of Appeals
decision to reverse the trial court's attorney fee award.
However, before a writ of certiorari may be granted, Rule 4 6 Utah
R. App. P. requires that there be some "special and important
reasons" shown.

Geraldine Brown has shown no "special and

important reasons" and, in fact, made no reference to Rule 4 6 in
her Petition.
Rule 4 6 provides:
Review by a writ of certiorari is not a
matter of right, but of judicial discretion,
-8-

and will be granted only for special and
important reasons. The following, while
neither controlling nor wholly measuring the
Supreme Court's discretion, indicate the
character of reasons that will be considered:
(a) When a panel of the Court of
Appeals has rendered a decision in conflict
with a decision of another panel of the Court
of Appeals on the same issue of law;
(b) When a panel of the Court of
Appeals has decided a question of state or
federal law in a way that is in conflict with
a decision of the Supreme Court;
(c) When a panel of the Court of
Appeals has rendered a decision that has so
far departed from the accepted and usual
course of judicial proceedings or has so far
sanctioned such a departure by a lower court
as to call for an exercise of the Supreme
Court's power of supervision; or
(d) When the Court of Appeals has
decided an important question of municipal,
state, or federal law which has not been, but
should be, settled by the Supreme Court.
The purpose of Rule 4 6 is to restrict Supreme Court review
of Court of Appeal decisions to those cases where substantial
issues of law exist or serious error has occurred.

See Mast v.

Standard Oil Co. of California, 140 Ariz. 1, 680 P.2d 137, 138
(1984).

Faced with a similar Petition for Writ of Certiorari,

the Oregon Supreme Court helped clarify the role of a Supreme
Court in reviewing Court of Appeals decisions.

In 1000 Friends

of Oregon v. Board of County Commissioners, Etc., 584 P.2d 1371,
1372 (Ore. 1978), the Court held that:

-9-

[t]he function of this Supreme Court is no
longer to afford every losing litigant a
forum to review errors said to have been
committed at trial or in an administrative
hearing. That function is now placed in the
Court of Appeals. Similarly, a party
asserting that the Court of Appeals, in turn,
has erred cannot for that reason alone expect
further review in this court. The process
must stop somewhere, and for most purposes
this is at the first level of appeal.
In her Petition, Geraldine Brown did not make any showing
that the Court of Appeals decision in this case was "in conflict
with a decision of another panel of the Court of Appeals on the
same issue of law," was "in conflict with a decision of the Utah
Supreme Court", departed from proper judicial procedures, or
involved an area of unsettled law best left to the Supreme Court
to decide.
In its opinion in this case, the Court of Appeals carefully
and correctly stated the rule of law regarding awards of attorney
fees in divorce actions.

Citing Huck v. Huck, 734 P.2d 417, 419

(Utah 1986), and Kerr v. Kerr, 610 P.2d 1380, 1384 (Utah 1980),
both of which are Utah Supreme Court decisions, the Court of
Appeals pointed out the requirement that the requesting party
show an attorney fee award is "reasonably needed" and that the
party is "unable" to pay the fees.

Given Geraldine Brown's

substantial assets, no need for an award of attorney fees could
be shown by Geraldine Brown at trial.

-10-

The Court of Appeals

decision correctly applied the rule of law established by the
Utah Supreme Court.
Having failed to show any "special and important reasons"
for this Court to review this case, Geraldine Brown's Petition
for Writ of Certiorari should be denied.
POINT II
REVERSAL OF THE ATTORNEY FEE JUDGMENT WAS THE
CORRECT DECISION IN THIS CASE.
Preliminary to an award of attorney fees, the trial court
must make a finding of need.

As quoted in Talley v. Talley, 739

P.2d 83 (Utah App. 1987), the Utah Supreme Court stated in Huck
v. Huck, 734 P.2d 417, 419 (Utah 1986):

"In divorce cases, an

award of attorney fees must be supported by evidence that it is
reasonable in amount and reasonably needed by the party
requesting the award."

The trial court made no finding of need

in this case.
The trial court focused on Brent Brown's income being
greater than that of Geraldine Brown.
only on Brent Brown's income.
need.

Geraldine Brown focused

The trial court made no finding of

In fact, Geraldine Brown presented no evidence of a

reasonable need or an inability to pay her attorney fees. Though
the Court recognized in its memorandum decision that Geraldine
Brown received income from the assets and support awarded in the
decree of divorce, the Court did not address the home, which had

-11-

substantial value, Geraldine Brown's ability to earn income,
Geraldine Brown's decrease in expenses, or otherwise address or
determine Geraldine Brown's need or inability to pay her own
fees.
Where Geraldine Brown's resources were sufficient for her to
pay her own attorney fees, Geraldine Brown failed to show a
reasonable need or inability to pay her own fees, and the Court
failed to make specific findings showing a need on the part of
Geraldine Brown, the Court of Appeals properly reversed the trial
court's award of attorney fees.
CONCLUSION
Geraldine Brown's Petition for Writ of Certiorari should be
denied.
Dated this

5

day of Qctolwrr, 1990.
HILLYARD, ANDERSON & OLSEN

W. HILLYAR^
'Attorney for Plaintiff/Appellant

-12-

CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
I hereby certify that four (4) true and correct copies of
the foregoing BRIEF IN OPPOSITION TO WRIT OF CERTIORARI were
mailed, postpaid, to Stephen W. Jewell, Attorney for
Defendant/Respondent, at 15 South Main, Third Floor, First
Security Bank Building, Logan, Utah 84321, this
Oatmbur, 1990.
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ADDENDUM

MEMORANDUM DECISION, filed February 6, 1989

..

FINDINGS OF FACT AND CONCLUSIONS OF LAW, filed
February 7, 198 9
ORDER AND JUDGMENT, filed April 7, 1989

. . ..

COURT OF APPEALS OPINION, filed August 31, 1990,
remitted October 4, 1990
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IN THE FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT, COUNTY OF CACHE
STATE OF UTAH
BRENT "W" BROWN,

]
],

Plaintiff

MEMORANDUM DECISION

v.
1

Civil No.

24569

GERALDINE K. BROWN,
Defendant

The parties were divorced in March of 1986,

The Plaintiff

prior to divorce was a partner in a company called Intergrated
Systems Engineering which he later sold and was taken on as an
employee by the purchaser.

Testimony indicated that the year

prior to the divorce when he was in this situation his income
was $100,000.00+ annually.

At the time of the divorce, his inccr,,.

was zero having terminated any employment.

At that time, based

on the prior track record of the plaintiff, indicated thai: he was
not going^ to remain at zero income and indicated that he had the
ability to generate income.
The Court estimiated an income of at least historically of
$54,000.00 minimum.

An alimony order of $200.00 per month was

granted based upon that projection and $300.00 per month per child
support for three children.

It was estimated that he would soon be

making again substantial monies was correct and was a conservative
estimate because the evidence shows that the year after his divorce
he purchased Intergrated Systems Engineering himself and his own
•personal financial statement submitted to a bank in September,

A-2
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1988 he declares now a net worth of $1,157,000.00 and an annual
income of $130,000.00 per year.
The defendant has filed a Petition

based on this change or

circumstances for an increase in child support and alimony.
Defendant has submitted as Exhibit 4, a financial statement updated
from the September 1988 Financial Statement he submitted to the
bank in which he declares his monthly income of $10,000.00 per mor .\
as only $6,000.00.

The Court recognizes that financial statements

submitted to banks for purposes of loans are probably inflated ar.d
that financial statements submitted to the Court in divorce actions
are probably deflated, and the figure is somewhere inbetween.
The Court finds that in any event that there is a substantial
change of circumstances in the defendant's income and it does not
appear simply to be coincidental that his income the year before his
divorce was in the $100,000.00+ category annually and no income at
the time of divorce and then two years later his income is in the
$130,000.00 range at least so reflected on the statements c.*bmittc5
to the bank last September.
The Plaintiff testified that there was several reasons for the
decrease in his projected earnings in September, 1938 and his new
present financial declaration.

Mainly being the type of business

he has and the necessity of liquidation of assets and the necessity
of decreasing his own income
problems.

monthly because of the business

He eliminated his bonuses, and has liquidated his stocks

wherein he had formerly received interest and dividend incci.o.

Z1

Brown v. Brown
Civil No. 24569
Page Three

this was because of the Petition for Modification was filed of ccurs:
is not known and the Court will not assume that to be the case.
However, the Court feels his present financial declaration which
is his Exhibit 4, is more conservative than his actual income.
The Court feels that the $130,000.00 on his financial statement of
September 19 88 which is defendant's Exhibit 3 is probably inflated.
The Court will depart from the established guidelines because
of the factor of the debt structure that was testified to by the
plaintiff in his business that he now solely cv/ns but will j.se Lhe
$72,000.00 September figure deducting therefrom the bonus commission
and dividend income and arrive at a figure of $700.00 per month pe::
child as the modified order on child support payments.

The Court

feels this is equitable taking into account the debt structure of
Integrated Systems Engineering from where he received his income.
As factors on alimony you have to take into account his increased
ability to provide the standard of living
his income taking

that is now compatabie wi'ch

into account those factors listed in the English

case, the Jones case, and the Nelson case, taking

into account

to try to maintain as close as you can the same standard of living
at this time as was available before and an ability at the present
time to pay and the needs of the defendant.

The Court will therefor*

increase the alimony award to $500.00 per month.
Defendant is also asking attorney!s fees for this.

Section

30-3-3 of the U.C.A. has been interpreted to include actions for

A-4
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Modification.

See Kallas v. Kallas, 614 P.2nd 641.

Plaintiff's

ability to pay attorney's fees is obviously much greater than
that of the defendant, the defendant only having the income that
she realizes from investment of funds she received from the divorce
plus her child support and alimony.

Defendant's counsel testified

as to the hours and the necessity of the amount of hours for
purpose of his hearing and the reasonableness of his hourly fee
-and with the figure of around $4,000.00 attorney's fees.

However

in checking over his Exhibit showing the amount of time spent,
namely concerning the cost of the curb or gutter.

The Court feels

there are some items that were not necessary and has therefore
reduced the attorney's fees award to $3,000.00 as opposed to
$4,000.00 plus costs.
Counsel for defendant to prepare the appropriate modification
order.
Dated this

Q}

day of March, 1989.

Stephen W. Jewell, 3814
Attorney at Lav
15 South Main, Third Floor
First. Security Bank Building
Logan, Utah
84321
Telephone:
(801) 753-2000
IN THE FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT, COUNTY OF CACHE
STATE OF UTAH

BRENT •*• BROWN,
FINDINGS OF FACT AND
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW

Plaintiff,
vs.
GERALDIME K\ BROWH,

Civil No. 24569
Defendant-

This matter came on hearing before the Court, the
Honorable VeNoy Christoffersen presiding, on January 17, 1989,
and again on February 23, 1989-

Defendant was present

represented by counsel, Stephen W. Jewell*

and

Plaintiff was

present only on February 28, 1989, and represented by counsel
on January 17, 1989, and February 28, 1989.

The Court having

heard the evidence and testimonies presented and the arguments
of counsel, and being fully advised in the premises, now finds
and concludes as follows:
FINDINGS OF FACT
lm

The parties were divorced on or about March 1&,

2.

Prior to the divorce r Plaintiff was a partner in a

1986.

company called INTEGRATED SYSTEMS ENGINEERING, which he later
sold and was taken on as an employee by the purchaser.

?4um^GL
FILED

FILED

>» A P f '- 10p3
n

: H

7 1939

A

3*
excess

Prior to the divorce, Plaintiff's income vas in
ol $100,000.00.

4»

At the time ol the divorce, Plaintiff's income vas

zero, having terminated any employment.
5.

At the time ol the divorce, based on Plaintiff's

ability to generate income, the Court estimated an income lor
Plaintill ol at least historically $54,000.00 minimum.
alimony order ol £200.00 per

An

month vas granted based on that

projection and S300.00 per month lor child support lor three
(3) children vas ordered.
6.

The year lolloving the divorce, or in or about

December 1986, Plaintill purchased INTEGRATED SYSTEMS
ENGINEERING himsell and currently is the sole owner ol
INTEGRATED SYSTEMS ENGINEERING.
7.

Plaintiff's net vorth as ol September 1988, vas

approximately SI,157,000.GO.
8.

Although Plaintill represented

on a financial

statement to Zion's First National Bank dated September 15,
1988, that his annual income vas $130,000.00 per

year,

Plaintall testilied at trial that his annual income vas
actually only $72,000.00.

The court recognizes that financial

statements submitted to banks lor purposes

ol loans are

probably inllated and that financial statements submitted to
the Court in divorce actions are probably dellated and that
Plaintiff's income is somevhere in betveen those tvo figures.
The court, hovever, declines to establish an exact income
figure.

9.

It does not appear simply to be coincidental that

Plaintiff's income the year before his divorce was in the
$100,000.00 plus range annually and no income at the time of
the divorce, and then two years later his income is again in
the $130,000.00 range, or at least &o reflected on the
statement submitted to the bank in September of 1988.
10.

The Court finds that in ^ny event there is a

substantial and material change of circumstances in that
Defendant's income has increased substantially from the time
of the divorce, sufficient to warrant a modification of the
decree and to grant Defendant's Petition.
11.

The child support as previously ordered of $200.00

p&r month p^r- child shall be modified and increased so that
Plaintiff shall pay $700.00 p&r month p&r child for child
support payments.
12.

Although the Court is not specifically following

the established child support, guidelines, the Court feels this
is equitable taking into account the debt structure of
INTEGRATED SYSTEMS ENGINEERING from where Plaintiff receives
his income.
13.

After taking into account as factors on alimony.

Plaintiff's increased ability to provide the standard of
living that is now compatible with his income, taking into
account those factors listed in the ENGLISH case, the JONES
case, and the NELSON case, and taking into account the Court's
attempt to maintain as close as possible the same standard of
living at. this time as was availably at the time of the
divorce and an ability at the present time for Plaintiff to
3

A

provide support* the needs of Defendant, and the ability of
Defendant to provide her own support, the Court will,
therefore, modify the Decree and increase the alimony avard
from $200-00 per month to $500.00 p&r
14.

month.

The Court finds that the £4,000.00 paid by

Defendant for curb and gutter BBB&BBm&nt.B are the obligation
of the Defendant as the owner of the home and are not the
obligation of Plaintiff.
15.
IB&BP

Defendant's counsel testified regarding attorney's

showing the time spent, the hourly rate charged, and the

necessity of the number of hours spent in light of the
difficulty of the case.

It was stipulated by counsel for the

Plaintiff that the rate charged was a reasonable one and was
commonly charged lor

such actions in the community.

finds that Plaintiff's ability to pay attorney's 1B€*B

The Court
is

obviously much greater than that of Defendant, Defendant only
having the income that she realizes from investment of funds
she received from the divorce plus her child support and
alimony.

However, in checking over the exhibit provided by

Defendant's counsel showing the amount of time spent, the
court IB^IS

that there are some items that were not necessary;

namely, concerning the costs of curb and gutter, the Court,
therefore, finds that a reasonable award o± attorney's IB&B

to

Defendant from Plaintiff is $3,000.00, plus costs.
16.

There having been no evidence regarding Plaintiff's

Counterpetition, and a Motion to Dismiss the Counter-petition
having been made by D&i&ndBn-t^ s counsel at the conclusion of
Plaintiff's case and chief, and Plaintiff indicating his
4

intent to withdraw his Counterpetition, the Court finds

that

the Counterpetition should be dismissed*
17.

The Court incorporates herein by reference such

other facts and findings as are stated in the Memorandum
Decision dated March 3, 1989.
From the foregoing Findings of Fact, the Court now enters
the following:

CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
1.

There has been a substantial and material change in

circumstances in Plaintiff's income and ability to provide
child support, and alimony from the time of the decree, and
that said substantial and material change is sufficient to
warrant a modification of the Decree of Divorce entered in
this matter*
2.

In view of the substantial and material change in

circumstances, the court concludes that Defendant's Petition
to Modify as to child support and alimony should be granted
and that child support should be increased to $700.00 p&r
month p&T child and that, alimony should be increased to
$500.00 p&r
3.

month.
The Court further concludes $4,000*00 paid by

Defendant for curb and gutter assessment is the obligation of
Defendant as the owner of the property and, therefore, the
obligation of the Defendant.

Defendant's Petition as to said

curb and gutter assessment should not be granted.
4.

In veiw of the dl±l^r&nc.B

in earning ability and

actual income received by both parties, Defendant has

A

sufficiently demonstrated the financial need for attorney's
fees.

The court concludes that S3,000.00 as a reasonable

amount for attorney's fees and that the number of hours spent
were necessary in light of the difficulty of the case, the
rate charged for attorney's fees vas reasonable as stipulated
by opposing counsel and is commonly charged for divorce
actions in the community and that the award of attorney's fees
is based on the ne^&d and results acheived in the case.
5.

Plaintiff's Counterpetition should be dismissed.

6.

The Order and Judgment entered in this matter shall

be effective as of January 17, 1989.
7.

The Court incorporates herein by r&±&r&nc&

such

other conclusions of law as are stated in the Memorandum
Decision dated March 3, 1989.
DATED this

\

day of Haxc^i, 1989.

BY T H E C O U R T :
//
/ //
VeNoy

Chri&±.a±±E>rs&ri

District

6

Judge

CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
I hereby certify that on the
3Q.^ day of March, 1989, I
mailed a true and correct copy of the foregoing Findings of
Fact and Conclusions of Law and Motice to the foregoing
persons, postage pre-paid thereon, by depositing in the United
States Mail*
Richard B* Johnson
Attorney at Law
1327 South 800 East, Suite 300
Orera, UT 84058
Brent W. Brown
1622 East 1080 North
Logan, UT 84321

NOTICE
Counsel for Plaintiff is hereby notified that pursuant to
Rule 4-504(2) of the Utah Code of Judicial

Administration,

counsel has five (5) days to submit any objections to the
Court•
DATED this^T-T^'

day of March, 1989.
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Stephen W. Jewell, 3814
Attorney for Defendant
15 South Hain, Third Floor
First Security Bank Building
Logan, Utah
84321
Telephone:
(801) 753-2000
IN THE FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT, COUNTY OF CACHE
STATE OF UTAH
BRENT * W

BROWN,
ORDER AND JUDGMENT

Plaintiff,
vs.
GERALDINE K-

BROWN,
Civil No. 24569

Defendant-

This matter came on for hearing before the Court, the
Honorable VeNoy Christoffersen presiding, on January 17, 1989,
and again on February 28, 1989.

Defendant was present and

represented by counsel, Stephen W„ Jewell.

Plaintiff was

present only on February 28, 1989, and represented by counsel
on January 17, 1989, and February 28, 1989.

The Court having

heard the evidence and testimonies presented and the arguments
of counsel, and being fully advised in the premises, and
having previously entered its Findings of Fact and Conclusions
of Law, now makes the following Order and Judgment.
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED AMD DECREED AS FOLLOWS:
1.

The First Cause of Action and Second Cause of

Action in Defendant's Petition to rtodify Decree of Divorce,
regarding child support and alimony respectively, shall be and
are hereby granted.

Number

FiLED

^7 ^,

N'J ^09•'__

RLf=G

2.

It is ordered that child support shall increase

from $300.00 to $700.00 p&r month pe^r child*
3.

It is further ordered "that alimony shall increase

from $200.00 to $500.00 p€>r month.
4.

Said modified child support, and alimony payments

shall be paid effective as of January 17, 1989, and Defendant
is granted a judgment against. Plaintiff for all amounts oving
from that date -to "the date of this order.
5.

The Third and Four*th Causes of Action in

Defendant's Petition to Modify Decree of Divorce regarding
road assessments and withholding of child support and punitive
damages shall be and are hereby denied.
6.

Defendant shall be and is hereby awarded a judgment

against Plaintiff as and for attorney's fees in the amount of
$3,000.00.
7.

All other provisions of the De^ar&& entered

previously in this action shall remain as stated.
8*

Plaintiff's Counter-Petition is denied and the same

shall be and is hereby dismissed.
DATED t h i s

_J3

day o f

JLfLMJL

l&afeah,

1989.

BY THE COURT,:

/I

VeNoy Chmsto^fei^sen
D i s t r i c t : Judg£
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CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
I hereby certify that on the 1~-X„y_ day of March, 1989, I
mailed a true and correct copy of the foregoing Order and
Judgment and Notice to the foregoing p&r&anB* postage pre-paid
thereon, by depositing in the United States Mail*

Richard B. Johnson
Attorney at Lav
1327 South aOO East, Suite 300
Orera, UT 84058
Brent W. Broun
1622 East 1080 North
Logan, UT 84321
J^jJ±±x}J*

NOTICE
Counsel for Plaintiff is hereby notified that pursuant to
Rule 4-504(2) of the Utah Code oi

Judicial Administration,

counsel has five (5) days to submit any objections to the
Court.
DATED this

day of March, 1989.
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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS

flUtf'SI

1°?0

OPINION
(Not For Publication)

v.
Geraldine K. Brown,

Case No. 890293-CA

Defendant and Appellee.

First District, Cache County
The Honorable VeNoy Christofferson
Attorneys:

--*•>

"

, a*;\c:**i"-%^

)

Plaintiff and Appellant,

?»_. * « —

%%A

ooOoo
Brent W. Brown,

i

Lyle W. Hillyard, Logan, for Appellant
Stephen W. Jewell, Logan, for Appellee

Before Judges Bench, Davidson, and Orme.
BENCH, Judge:
Appellant Brent W. Brown appeals an order that modified
his decree of divorce by increasing the amount of alimony and
child support payments he is to pay to appellee. Appellant
claims that the trial court abused its discretion in increasing
alimony and child support payments when (1) the appellee failed
to meet her burden of showing a substantial change in
circumstances necessitating the increase, (2) the appellee
produced no evidence of a necessity for the increases or of her
inability to aid in her own and the children 1 s support, and (3)
the trial court made no findings regarding necessity and
ability.
FINDINGS OF FACT
It is reversible error if a trial court fails to make
findings on all material issues unless the facts in the record
are "clear, uncontroverted, and capable of supporting only a
finding in favor of the judgment." Kinkella v. Baucrh, 660 P.2d
233, 236 (Utah 1983). These findings "should be sufficiently
detailed and include enough subsidiary facts to disclose the

A

steps by which the ultimate conclusion on each factual issue
was reached.- Acton v. Deliran, 737 P.2d 996, 999 (Utah 1987)
(quoting Rucker v. Dalton, 598 P.2d 1336, 1338 (Utah 1979)),
The trial court's findings in the present case do not include
sufficient detail for us to determine what steps it took in
reaching its conclusions as to the material issues that must be
considered prior to modifying a divorce decree. In fact, the
findings are so sparse we do not know if the material issues
were even considered.
"The threshold requirement for relief [in a petition to
modify a divorce decree] is a showing of a substantial change
of circumstances occurring since the entry of the*, decree and
not contemplated in the decree itself." Navlor v. Navlor, 700
P.2d 707, 710 (Utah 1985). In the present case, the trial
court failed to make any specific findings on appellant's
ability to pay, which is the alleged substantial change in
circumstances. In particular, the trial court's determination
that appellant's income was somewhere within -a very broad range
was insufficient to establish appellant's income—a critical
factor in determining the larger question of his ability to
pay. Because we do not know the factual basis for the trial
court's conclusion that a substantial change in circumstances
had occurred, we cannot determine whether appellee met her
burden of proving this threshold requirement. Nor can we
determine whether the trial court abused its discretion in so
finding.
In awarding alimony, the trial court must consider each
of the following three factors: "(1) the financial conditions
and needs of the receiving spouse; (2) the ability of the
receiving spouse to produce a sufficient income for him or
herself; and (3) the ability of the responding spouse to
provide support." Throckmorton v. Throckmorton, 767 P.2d 121,
124 (Utah Ct. App. 1988). In the present case the trial court
failed to make specific findings concerning any of these
factors. In particular, the trial court made no findings as to
appellee's ability to work. See, e.g., Hialev v. Hicrlev, 676
P.2d 379, 382 (Utah 1983). The record is also "void of any
facts as to [appellant's] or [appellee's] monthly expenses
which are relevant both to [appellee's] 'need* and
[appellant's] ability to pay." Throckmorton, 767 P.2d at 125.
Again, we are unable to determine whether the trial court's
order increasing alimony was within its discretion because we
do not know upon what factual basis it rests.

390293-CA
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In determining child support the trial court must
consider the following factors enumerated in Utah Code Ann.
§ 78-45-7(2) (1987):
(a)
(b)
(c)
(d)
(e)
(f)
(g)

the standard of living and situation of the parties;
the relative wealth and income of the parties;
the ability of the obligor to earn;
the ability of the obligee to earn;
the need of the obligee;
the age of the parties;
the responsibility of the obligor for the support of
others.

Failure to consider these statutory factors is an abuse of
discretion. Durfee v. Durfee, 140 Utah Adv. Rep. 42, 43-44
(Ct. App. 1990). The trial court in the present case has not
indicated that it considered any of these statutory factors.
We are therefore precluded from reviewing the merits of its
award.
The trial court failed to make adequate factual findings
concerning the substantial change in circumstances and the
other material factors identified above. Inasmuch as the
record is not clear and uncontroverted and capable of only
supporting the t^rial court's award of increased alimony and
child support^ we"vacate the trial court's order and remand for
further proceedings to take additional evidence on these
factors^ as needed/ and for entry of findings concerning each
factor identified above and any other material factor which may
arise. While we do not approve or disapprove of the amounts
awarded by the trial court/ we do caution that M[w]e do not
intend our remand to be merely an exercise in bolstering and
supporting the conclusion already reached.* Allred v. Allred,
141 Utah Adv. Rep. 14/ 16 (Utah Ct. App. 1990).
ATTORNEY FEES
Appellee was awarded attorney fees by the trial court
based on the difference in earning ability of the parties.
Appellant argues that this was an abuse of the trial court's
discretion in that appellee failed to prove that she was in
financial need.
Before a trial court may award attorney fees in a divorce
raatter# the requesting party must show that award of attorney

890293-CA
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fees is Hreasonably needed by the party requesting the award."
Huck v, Huck, 734 P.2d 417, 419 (UtahH 1986)• In essence,
appellee must show that she would be unable to cover the costs
of litigation,H Kerr v. Kerr, 610 P.2d 1380, 1384 (Utah 1980).
The trial court, however, erroneously concluded that
attorney fees were warranted because "[p]laintiff«s ability to
pay attorney fees is obviously much greater than that of
defendant."
In support of the trial court's conclusion, appellee
cites Andersen v. Andersen, 757 P.2d 476, 480 (Utah Ct. App.
1988) for the proposition that disparity between the parties'
abilities to pay is a sufficient ground upon which to find
need. We note, however, that in Andersen the -plaintiff
testified that she had n& means with which to pay her fees."
Id. at 480 (emphasis added). Appellee, on the other hand, has
significant means with which to pay her fees. ££• Huck, 734
P.2d at 420 (granting of attorney fees when party had no
-liquid assets").
In light of appellee's significant assets, we find that
she failed to meet her burden of proof that she reasonably
needed the award. We therefore vacate the trial court's award
of attorney fees. No cost or fees awarded on appeal.

Hussell W. Bench, Judge-

WE CONCUR:

Richard C. Davidson, Judge

Gregor^^. Orrae, Judge
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